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Abstract
Background: We have previously proposed that trials of social interventions can be done within a “realist” research
paradigm. Critics have countered that such trials are irredeemably positivist and asked us to explain our
philosophical position.
Methods: We set out to explore what is meant by positivism and whether trials adhere to its tenets (of necessity or
in practice) via a narrative literature review of social science and philosophical discussions of positivism, and of the
trials literature and three case studies of trials.
Results: The philosophical literature described positivism as asserting: (1) the epistemic primacy of sensory information;
(2) the requirement that theoretical terms equate with empirical terms; (3) the aim of developing universal laws; and (4)
the unity of method between natural and social sciences. Regarding (1), it seems that rather than embodying the
epistemic primacy of sensory data, randomised controlled trials (RCTs) of social interventions in health embrace an anti-
positivist approach aiming to test hypotheses derived deductively from prior theory. Considering (2), while some RCTs
of social interventions appear to limit theorisation to concepts with empirical analogues, others examine interventions
underpinned by theories engaging with mechanisms and contextual contingencies not all of which can be measured.
Regarding (3), while some trialists and reviewers in the health field do limit their role to estimating statistical trends as a
mechanistic form of generalisation, this is not an inevitable feature of RCT-based research. Trials of social interventions
can instead aim to generalise at the level of theory which specifies how mechanisms are contingent on context. In
terms of (4), while RCTs are used to examine biomedical as well as social interventions in health, RCTs of social
interventions are often distinctive in using qualitative analyses of data on participant accounts to examine questions of
meaning and agency not pursued in the natural sciences.
Conclusion: We conclude that the most appropriate paradigm for RCTs of social interventions is realism not positivism.
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Background
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have been used for
many decades to evaluate not only biomedical interven-
tions but also social interventions in fields such as public
health, health services, economics and education [1–4].
RCTs are used to generate some of the evidence
intended to inform evidence-based practice and policy.
Evidence-based policy has a long intellectual history in
which authors such as Donald Campbell and Karl
Popper have argued that social science experiments
should provide evidence to inform and assess “piecemeal
social engineering” [5, 6]. This process involves incre-
mental changes to public policy, which are evaluated to
assess whether they have achieved their intended objec-
tives and whether there have been any unintended
harmful consequences. But in fields such as public
health and health services, evidence-based policy, and in
particular the use of RCTs, has attracted criticism in
terms of its ontological (i.e. concerning the nature of
reality) and epistemological (i.e. concerning how we
know about reality) assumptions. These are said to situ-
ate RCTs firmly within a “positivist” paradigm [7–11].
We will explore later what is meant by positivism.
We have previously proposed that RCTs can contrib-
ute to “realist” evaluation of social interventions in pub-
lic health or health services [12]. Realist evaluators argue
that rather than merely examining “what works”, evalua-
tions should examine what works, for whom and under
what conditions [13]. Informed by critical realist philoso-
phy [14], they suggest that social interventions do not
produce outcomes directly but rather that interventions
introduce new resources into social settings (or redis-
tribute or displace existing resources). Local actors
might then draw on these resources to enact local
actions, which may then in turn trigger mechanisms that
generate the intended and unintended “outcomes”’ of
the intervention. Realist evaluators propose that the
focus of evaluation should be on these mechanisms,
which may play out differently in different contexts to
generate different outcomes.
Critical realists further suggest that we can think of the
world in terms of an “empirical” realm consisting of ex-
perience, an “actual” realm of occurrences whether or not
these are observed and a “real” realm consisting of unob-
servable causal mechanisms that generate events in the
actual realm. Realists argue against understanding causal-
ity merely in terms of observed “constant conjunctions” of
causes and effects. They argue that causal mechanisms are
tendencies and whether effects are generated depends on
other factors. Mechanisms may be triggered but cancelled
out by other mechanisms or may not be triggered at all
depending on local circumstances. Therefore, a lack of
“constant conjunction” does not necessarily mean that our
theories about mechanisms are wrong [15, 16]. Instead of
evaluations focusing principally on estimating overall as-
sociations between allocation or exposure to an interven-
tion and measures of outcome (i.e. effect sizes), realist
evaluations aim to develop and test hypotheses concern-
ing context-mechanism-outcome configurations [13].
We have previously suggested that RCTs and systematic
reviews of RCTs could contribute to a realist approach to
the evaluation of social interventions by focusing not
merely on overall effect sizes but also by building and test-
ing hypotheses about context-mechanism-outcome con-
figurations. We have suggested that the plausibility of
context-mechanism-outcome hypotheses could be exam-
ined by assessing whether these are borne out by “data sig-
natures” from trials. Within a single RCT, moderator
analyses might examine how outcomes vary between sub-
groups of sites, clusters or individuals defined by varying
contextual factors. Within a systematic review, meta-
regressions might explore how study-level effect sizes are
moderated by context. The aspect of context in question
(for example, whether the setting was urban, suburban or
rural) need to be measured in a comparable way across
trials or such information needs to be available from other
sources available to the reviewer.
However, these proposals have been criticized by some
realist evaluators, who argue that RCTs are irredeemably
positivist and therefore inimical to realist enquiry [8].
Our realist critics have requested that we discuss our
views concerning whether RCTs are positivist [8]:
“Bonell et al… indicate that they do not necessarily
agree that RCTs are based on a positivist ontological
and epistemological foundation, but they opt not to
discuss this further… This is a pity, because … it is
the ontological position and its epistemological
consequences that limit the usefulness of RCTs when
applied to complex interventions.” (p. 125)
We agree that it would be useful for us to address this
question of whether or not trials are positivist. RCTs are
often described as being positivist by social scientists
and this view may be an important barrier to harnessing
realist approaches to improve the conduct of trials of so-
cial interventions in public health and health services,
and enabling deeper collaborations between trialists and
social scientists.
Methods
The paper does not aim to repeat all our previous argu-
ments in favour of realist RCTs but instead aims to focus
on the question of what positivism means and whether
RCTs are of necessity or in practice positivist. We first
examined how the term positivism has been used in the
social science literature in the fields of health and educa-
tion that describes or criticises RCTs as positivist. We
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then explored how positivism has been defined in the
wider literature on the philosophy of science. The paper
then goes on to consider whether public health and
health services research RCTs appear to embody the
various tenets of positivism, and whether this is a neces-
sary or contingent feature. In doing so we refer to three
exemplar trials of school-based health interventions (see
Table 1).
Results
What is positivism?
Social science references to RCTs as a positivist design
RCTs are frequently described by social scientists work-
ing in the fields of health and education as positivist.
Some of this literature is descriptive and some critical. A
good example of the former is Green and Thorogood [7]
who described RCTs thus:
“the ‘classic’ design of the positivist tradition, as it sets
up a study capable of answering a question about
cause and effect.” (p. 34)
Green and Thorogood identified several features of
positivism:
“[positivism] assumes that there is a stable reality out
there… human understandings may be flawed … but
there is a potential ‘right’ explanation that we are
getting closer to as understanding of health and
disease increases… There is a stress on empiricism, or
studying only observable phenomena…, a unity of
method, the idea that eventually, when mature, all
sciences will share the same methods of enquiry. At
this point of maturity, the proper object of scientific
inquiry is the establishment of relationships of cause
and effect and the generation of laws about the
natural world. That many of the social sciences focus
on other questions is, in this view, evidence of their
immaturity.” (p. 12, italics as published)
Authors who criticize RCTs as positivist tend to offer
less comprehensive definitions than above of what they
mean by positivism, the term sometimes being used pe-
joratively and vaguely. The originators of realist evalu-
ation [13] acknowledged this tendency themselves:
“Experimental evaluation has struggled because of a
basically ‘positivist’ understanding of the nature of
social causation. We hesitate to put it like this, since
the term ‘positivism’ these days has been reduced to a
crude term of abuse. It is used as an evil totem by
those intent on musing about there being no place for
scientism in understanding the rich, meaningful,
emotional world of human intercourse.” (p. 30)
What features of RCTs are presented as positivist then
in these critical accounts? Rowe and Oltmann [10]
suggest RCTs are positivist because they aim to produce
objective knowledge including about causality and, in
doing so, aim to test hypotheses:
“The evidence upon which EBP [evidence based
practice] is premised is usually derived from
experimental research conducted in professional
disciplines that are firmly rooted in the positivist
paradigm; the research method most closely
associated with this is the randomised controlled trial
(RCT). RCTs are quantitative, controlled experiments
in which the effect of an intervention can be
determined more objectively than by observational
studies… It seems clear that those who most strongly
advocate the use of RCTs in education have an
inherent bias against other methods of data collection,
strongly positioning themselves within a positivist
interpretation of reality…Positivist research maintains
that knowledge is objective, that it involves hypothesis
testing and identifies causality.” (p. 6-7)
We will explore whether this quest for objective know-
ledge and focus on causality is viewed as a distinguishing
feature of positivism in the philosophical literature.
The argument that hypothesis testing implies a
positivist approach has been made not only by Rowe
and Oltmann [10] but also by Tones and Green [11],
who similarly labelled RCTs as positivist and sug-
gested that trials take what they describe as a
“hypothetico-deductive approach” to generating scien-
tific knowledge (p. 310). As we shall see in the next
section, the philosophy of science literature takes a
very different view about positivism and the
hypothetico-deductive approach.
Other critics have focused on different aspects of what
they see as RCTs’ positivist approach. For example,
Pearce and Raman [9], in their critique of the positivistic
application of RCTs to informing public policy, focused
on positivism aiming to develop generalisable conclu-
sions devoid of context:
“When RCTs are presented as offering generalizable
evidence of what works, the conditions and
assumptions built into their doing and interpretation
are erased from the story... The wider context in
which an intervention works is ignored, and it is
implied that success in one context can simply be
transferred to another.” (p. 35)
This concern with generalisable knowledge and
whether it implies a lack of concern with context is
something that we will return to in the next section.
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In their own critique of RCTs, the realist evaluators
Marchal et al. [8] focused on positivism as involving a
concern with observable phenomena without consider-
ing the ways in which causation actually operates. They
described RCTs as being:
“built upon objectivist (or ‘positivist’) assumptions, which
hold that causality cannot be observed and that the best
we can do is to demonstrate regularity between a
particular intervention and a particular outcome” (p. 125)
This point will be considered further under point 2 of
the next section.
Taken together, these descriptive and critical accounts
of trials as positivist enable us to start to develop a sense
of what positivism is and why RCTs might be viewed as a
positivist strategy of research. But to get a more systematic
sense of what are the distinguishing tenets of positivism,
we need to examine how positivism has been defined in
the wider literature on the philosophy of science.
Descriptions of positivism in the philosophy of science
literature
The philosophical literature has described positivism’s
long history and multiple schools ranging across differ-
ent academic disciplines [17–19]. This literature has sys-
tematically mapped out several key tenets concerning
how positivist social enquiry should proceed, some but
not all of which also appear in the trials literature
reviewed above [16, 18, 19].
The epistemic primacy of direct sensory information
as the basis for scientific knowledge The philosophical
literature has not identified objectivity as a distinguishing
feature of positivism. Philosophers hold that positivism im-
plies a belief not merely in a stable reality that exists inde-
pendently of our senses (which critical realists also accept),
but that knowledge of this world must derive entirely from
our senses. In describing positivism, Blaikie [16] suggested:
“That which is to count as knowledge must be based
on experience, on what an observer can perceive by
Table 1 Three exemplar trials of school-based health
interventions
Child Development Program (CDP) RCT [21, 22, 38, 39]
Timing: 1982–89
Setting and sample: three elementary schools in the intervention group
and three elementary schools in the control group, in northern California.
Intervention: this aimed to “encourage pro-social behaviour by providing
children with several types of experience which serve to engender a
sense of community and a climate of mutual respect and concern in
the classroom and school” [22] (p.149). Activities included cooperative
learning, and involvement of children in rule setting, discussions and
helping activities.
Outcome evaluation: this reported positive intervention effects on
interview-assessed cognitive problem-solving and conflict resolution
skills, increased questionnaire-reported peer acceptance, reduced loneliness
and anxiety and increased observer-rated prosocial behaviours. There were
no effects on questionnaire-reported measures of self-esteem, liking of
school, perceived social competence or popularity.
Process evaluation: observations indicated that intervention classrooms
were more likely to use strategies promoted by the intervention,
particular where teachers were rated as of high competence.
Rationale for including as an example: this RCT is quite old and did not
employ any qualitative research despite focusing on a social
intervention. It is therefore a good case study to assess whether in
practice some trials might be positivist in approach.
A Stop Smoking in Schools Trial (ASSIST) RCT [27, 31, 32]
Timing: 2001–4
Setting and sample: Twenty-nine secondary schools allocated to intervention
and 30 to be controls in western England and south-east Wales.
Intervention: Secondary school-based peer education outside classrooms
focused on smoking prevention.
Outcome evaluation: This reported a reduction in the prevalence of smoking
in the past week overall and among those who had smoked at baseline.
Process evaluation: Quantitative and qualitative research found that
teachers generally supported the intervention despite concerns about
some aspects such as the possibility that students might nominate
some individuals as peer educators who teachers did not see as good
representatives of the school. The evaluation found that peer educators
themselves tended to focus messages on information more than
persuasion and primarily targeted non-smoking friends.
Rationale for including as an example: This was a trial led by one of the
authors of this paper (Initials withheld for blind-reviewing) which
though not explicitly realist or anti-positivist in orientation, nonetheless
focused on questions of how, for whom and under what circumstances
the intervention worked. It therefore offers a promising case study to
assess whether or not in practice a modern trial of a social intervention
has positivist tendencies.
Initiating change locally in bullying and aggression through the school
environment (INCLUSIVE) RCT [24, 46, 60]
Timing: 2014–17
Setting and sample: 20 secondary schools in the intervention group and
20 secondary schools in the control group, all in south-eastern England.
Intervention: a whole-school intervention to reduce bullying, aggression
via training staff in restorative practice, provision of local data and a
facilitator to enable local needs-led decisions involving staff and students
and a social and emotional learning curriculum.
Outcome evaluation: this evaluated effects on student questionnaire-
reported bullying and aggression (primary outcomes) plus secondary
Table 1 Three exemplar trials of school-based health interven-
tions (Continued)
outcomes including student substance use, mental and sexual health
and quality of life as well as staff attendance, quality of life and burnout.
Process evaluation: ongoing quantitative and qualitative research on
intervention implementation, reach, acceptability and mechanisms, and
how these varied by context.
Rationale for including as an example: this was a trial involving some of
the authors of this paper (initials withheld for blind-reviewing) and was
explicitly realist and anti-positivist in orientation. It is therefore a good
case study to assess whether trials can avoid the various tenets of positivism
or whether this is unavoidable.
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his or her senses…, it must be ‘pure experience’ with
an empty consciousness” (p. 14)
This view suggests that both our informal knowledge
as individuals and our more formal theories as social sci-
entists about how phenomena relate to one another can
be derived directly from sensory information. This view
has its roots in the “empiricist” philosophy, for example
of John Locke, which regarded the mind as a “blank
slate” upon which knowledge is written, purely by the
actions of generic logical mental processes applied to in-
formation from the senses [18]. The philosophy litera-
ture offers clarity on this point whereas the social
science literature on trials does not. Although Green
and Thorogood correctly suggested that positivism is
based on an empiricist approach to knowledge [7],
Tones and Green as well as Rowe and Oltmann sug-
gested incorrectly that positivists embrace a
hypothetico-deductive approach to producing knowledge
[10, 11]. How RCTs actually engage with these questions
will be explored later in this paper.
The requirement that theoretical terms must equate
with empirical terms Blaikie argued that positivism
holds that, to be meaningful, theoretical concepts must
be able to be translated directly into empirically measur-
able elements. Thus, it is not merely that positivists
focus on questions of cause and effect (indeed, realists
also clearly focus on such questions) but rather that pos-
itivists believe that research should examine causal links
between observable phenomena rather than speculating
about underlying, unobservable mechanisms that might
generate such causal links [16]. This echoes the argu-
ment made by Marchal et al. that RCTs are positivist be-
cause they do this [8]. Whether they do or not in
practice will be considered later in this paper.
The aim of developing universally applicable laws For
positivists, the aim of both natural sciences, such as biol-
ogy, chemistry and physics, and social sciences, such as
sociology, is to produce laws that apply universally, a point
raised above in relation to RCTs by Green and Thorogood
[7] and Pearce and Ramen [9]. Blaikie [16] suggested that
for positivists: “laws summarise observations by specifying
simple relations or constant conjunctions between phe-
nomena” (p. 15). Hacking [18] argued that positivists
advocate that science should understand causality not as a
thing in itself but solely in terms of the constant conjunc-
tions of observable phenomena. Bhaskar [14] wrote:
“Positivism pivots on the … theory of constant
conjunctions of atomistic events or states of affairs,
interpreted as the objects of actual or possible
experience.” (p. 158)
However, there is no suggestion in this literature that
the development of general laws implies a lack of inter-
est in contextual contingencies. Later in the paper, we
will explore how Karl Popper argued that science,
including social science, should concern itself with de-
veloping general laws of cause and effect but that these
should include within them consideration of how con-
textual contingencies will influence causation. Later in
this paper, we will explore how our case study RCTs
address questions of general conclusions.
A unity of method between the natural and social
sciences This unity of method, referred to above by
Green and Thorogood [7], concerns the overall approach
to doing science: the exclusive focus on identifying regu-
larities using researcher-controlled experiments. It does
not refer to the specific methods that each branch of sci-
ence uses because these will vary depending on the phe-
nomena under investigation. This goal of a unified
approach contrasts with the view that the social sciences
need a totally different approach to the natural sciences
because the “objects” of social scientific enquiry are
quite different and not natural phenomena, such as
atoms and antelopes. Humans are themselves subjects
who have their own interpretations of the world and
engage in willed, meaningful action. The classic anti-
positivistic approach to social science is exemplified in
the hermeneutic tradition of Max Weber which aims to
interpret and understand, rather than predict, action
based on the meanings conferred on it and the agency
underpinning it on the part of social actors [20]. We
shall explore later whether trials of social interventions
in the health sector take an exclusively natural science
approach or whether they engage with more Weberian
approaches.
Drawing on the philosophy literature, we have identi-
fied a systematic set of tenets that should distinguish a
positivist approach to research. The next section exam-
ines whether RCTs conducted in the field of public
health and health services actually embody these tenets
and, if so, whether this is a necessary or merely a contin-
gent feature. We make these assessments based on a re-
view of RCT research in public health and health
services, and in particular of the RCTs of school-based
health interventions described earlier.
Are randomised trials of social interventions in health
positivist?
Do trials give primacy to sensory information in building
knowledge?
There is no evidence that those undertaking RCTs of
social interventions in health assume that all knowledge
is derived from sensory experience. Medical Research
Council guidance for RCTs of complex interventions has
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highlighted the importance of developing coherent and
explicit theory of intervention mechanisms prior to, not
as a result of, evaluation [1].
The hypotheses that RCTs test certainly appear to be
derived deductively from prior theories of change,
whether or not these are explicitly stated. For example,
even in the case of our apparently positivist RCT of the
Child Development Program (CDP) intervention, where
there was no formal theory of change for the interven-
tion, the trial reports did nonetheless discuss the mecha-
nisms by which the intervention was intended to work,
grounded in descriptions of previous theory and empir-
ical research [21]. The research reports located the out-
comes to be examined in terms of gaps in previous
literature and of theory on children’s prosocial develop-
ment. These were not worded as formal hypotheses but
as expectations [22]. The ASSIST RCT prospectively
identified a primary outcome of recent smoking and was
explicitly informed by theory concerning the diffusion of
prevention messages within a school social network. The
INCLUSIVE RCT explicitly aimed to test hypotheses de-
rived from a sociological theory of change concerning
how changes to the school environment might promote
student engagement and health [23–25].
Tones and Green rightly cite Karl Popper as making
the case for science proceeding via the empirical testing
of hypotheses derived deductively from theory but incor-
rectly view this as a positivist strategy. In fact, Popper
argued for the hypothetico-deductive approach as an al-
ternative to the naïve inductive empiricism of positivism.
Popper himself was very clear that theories should direct
empirical social research rather than being inductively
built from it [6]:
“The fact that I have discussed the problem of social
experiments before discussing … the problem of
sociological … theories … does not mean that I think
observation and experiments are … logically prior to
theories. On the contrary I believe that theories are
prior to observations as well as experiments, in the
sense that the latter are significant only in relation to
theoretical problems.” (p. 89-90)
“[I]n the social sciences it is even more obvious than
in the natural sciences that we cannot see and observe
our objects before we have thoughts about them. For
most of the objects of social science, if not all of
them, are abstract objects: they are theoretical
constructions.” (p. 125)
Popper’s approach was a “post-positivist” one of onto-
logical realism, accepting that a world exists independent
of our senses but avoiding the naïve empiricism that saw
human knowledge being constructed only from sensory
information. Popper recommended the pursuit of object-
ive truth but the recognition that this can only occur via
attempts to test our cognitively derived theories. Theor-
ies will influence the questions we ask, what is observed
and how it will be measured.
Do trials require that theoretical concepts must translate
into empirical measures?
Most RCTs performed in the fields of public health and
health services research focus on statistical measures of
the association between quantitative measures of alloca-
tion or exposure to interventions and quantitative mea-
sures of health or risk states [1, 2]. This does appear at
first to suggest a positivist approach in that understand-
ing of cause and effect is apparently reduced to know-
ledge of constant conjunctions between empirical
measures. However, such an approach is not particular
to RCT research. Furthermore, in using statistics to esti-
mate associations between interventions and outcomes,
trialists are not searching for constant conjunctions. In-
deed, an assumption that different individuals allocated
to the same interventions will report different outcomes
(i.e. that interventions and outcomes are not constantly
conjoined) is built into trial statistics. An odds ratio, for
example, presents the relative odds of a particular out-
come in a group of individuals allocated to an interven-
tion compared to a group of individuals not thus
exposed. If intervention and outcome were constantly
conjoined (i.e. if every single individual exposed to the
intervention were to experience the same outcome) the
odds ratio would be infinity. A focus on aggregate effects
therefore does not imply that a trialist is thinking of
cause and effect in terms of simple constant conjunc-
tions. Rather, it is an attempt to estimate the extent to
which the net effect of an intervention on an overall
population for a particular outcome would be harmful
or beneficial if widely used instead of, or in addition to,
usual practice.
We would argue that while this statistical estimate of
overall harms and benefits should not be the only infor-
mation on causality that RCTs provide, it is nevertheless
a valid and useful question for informing decisions. A
primary focus on whole-population effects is appropriate
for example when considering the effects of public
health interventions informed by the Rose hypothesis,
since here the focus is on population-wide and not sub--
group effects [26]. For example, the ASSIST RCT re-
ported an overall effect of the intervention in reducing
smoking, not because the authors believed the interven-
tion would have the same effect on every individual or
in every school but because in judging the success of
public health interventions, it is important to estimate
the potential of the intervention to contribute towards
population-level reductions in risk [27]:
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“… if implemented on a UK-wide basis [ASSIST]
could potentially reduce the number of 14–15-year-
old school students taking up regular smoking by
43,289” (p. 1601)
This brings us to consider how interested trialists are
in understanding causality beyond statistical associations
of interventions and outcomes. It must be acknowledged
that many trials have been conducted which have not
theorised or empirically examined the intervening mech-
anisms or impacts that connect an intervention and its
endpoints [28]. Even where RCTs do include a theory of
change, in many cases this is little more than a string of
empirical measures with arrows denoting lines of caus-
ation from intervention to mediating factors to proximal
and distal outcomes, which is then sometimes empiric-
ally tested using mediation analyses [28]. Such theories
rarely describe the real mechanisms that underlie caus-
ation and generate outcomes, or how causal such mech-
anisms might play out variably in different contexts [29].
Analyses of mediation simply add links to the “if x then
y” thinking commonly attributed to RCTs [30]. In this
sense, perhaps many RCTs have, as Marchal et al. sug-
gest, restricted themselves to identifying conjunctions
between observable phenomena and have only engaged
with theoretical concepts where these have empirical
analogues.
However, this tendency is not universal. In the case
of the ASSIST RCT, which did not explicitly embrace
realist approaches, the use of statistical data as part
of a hypothetico-deductive approach within trials did
not preclude using other forms of evidence to assess
the plausibility of theories about mechanisms. The
embedded process evaluation drew on a range of data
including qualitative research on teachers’ and stu-
dents’ accounts of their own observations about how
implementation processes occur and how outcomes
might be generated [31, 32]. In the explicitly realist
INCLUSIVE RCT, the intervention theory of change
centred on how the intervention might enable an ero-
sion of “boundaries” between staff and students and
between students’ academic and broader learning,
which then encourages more students to exert agency
to commit to school and avoid engaging in risk be-
haviours such as violence that function as symbolic
markers of anti-school identity. The theory thus in-
cluded elements that were not open to quantitative
measurement but which were nonetheless included in
the theory of change to give a fuller account of the
way in which the intervention was intended to work.
Such work clearly does not fit with a positivist focus
only on constant conjunctions, and will be considered
in more detail below in our consideration of whether
RCTs necessarily imply a unity of method.
It is also worth highlighting that it is not only RCTs
that shed light on causality partly using statistical ana-
lyses of overall associations between exposure to inter-
ventions and outcomes. For example, the originators of
realist evaluation positively cited an evaluation of the
effect of prisoner education on reoffending rates, where
the analysis compared rates of recidivism between the
intervention group and a non-randomised historical
comparison group made up of a cohort of individuals
imprisoned prior to implementation of the intervention
[13]. It is not clear why using statistical association data
from randomised experiments as one way to assess the
plausibility of causal mechanisms should be considered
positivist, whereas drawing on evidence of statistical
associations from natural experiments is not.
Do trials aim to produce universally applicable laws?
A central feature of positivism lies in its attempt to iden-
tify law-like regularities. Indeed Marchal et al. argued
that RCTs are underpinned by Humean notions of con-
stant conjunction, directed toward identifying interven-
tions that are essentially linked to particular outcomes.
We disagree that this is a necessary feature of trials and
think that current practices among trialists instead sug-
gest a mixed, and arguably inconsistent, set of beliefs.
As discussed above, trialists do not have an expect-
ation of identifying constant conjunctions and hence
universally applicable laws at the level of the individual.
No-one who understands trial statistics could possibly
believe that any intervention is expected by trialists to
produce the same effects in different people. Further-
more, nearly all trial reports draw attention to the uncer-
tain generalisability of RCT evidence across groups of
individuals. Guidance for undertaking health RCTs [33]
explicitly has acknowledged that results from a trial may
be an uncertain guide to wider effects:
“External validity is a matter of judgment and depends
on the characteristics of the participants included in
the trial, the trial setting, the treatment regimens
tested, and the outcomes assessed.” (p. 20-21)
Furthermore, when social interventions in public
health or health services are transported from one
setting or population to another, they are commonly
subjected to a new RCT in the new situation prior to
wider use. This suggests that those involved accept that
evidence of effect in one context cannot unproblematic-
ally be accepted as evidence that the intervention will
work in the same way in a new time and place. The
Family Nurse Partnership demonstrated benefits when
evaluated in the USA, but in England had no effect on
smoking cessation, birthweight, rates of second pregnan-
cies or emergency hospital visits for the child [34, 35].
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It is also instructive to explore how systematic reviews
approach the question of generalisability because such
reviews bring together evidence from different settings.
That systematic reviewers also are aware of the far from
unproblematic generalisability of trial evidence is evi-
denced by their common practice of defining a priori in-
clusion criteria for reviews not only in terms of
interventions and evaluation methods but also in terms
of the populations and settings involved in studies [36].
Assessment tools used by systematic reviewers include
judgements of issues such as “directness”, which refers
to the extent to which the evidence within the review
provides evidence of direct or indirect relevance to the
context of interest [37].
However, we acknowledge that the picture is mixed re-
garding whether those doing and synthesizing RCTs be-
lieve their results to be relevant universally or only
relevant context-specifically. Many RCTs have confined
themselves to examining overall effects and have not ex-
plored how these effects are moderated by the character-
istics of individuals receiving the intervention or settings
in which the intervention is delivered. In the case of our
most potentially positivist RCT case study, that of the
CDP intervention, the trial assessed the intervention in
terms of its overall effects, finding evidence of various
benefits including students being more accepting of
other students, less lonely or anxious, with increased
problem-solving and resolution skills and prosocial be-
haviours [21, 22, 38, 39]. The research did not examine
how outcomes varied other than by age [21, 22] not even
assessing whether effects varied by sex other than in the
case of one outcome measure of between-sex friendship
nominations by sex [39]. The trial reports did not expli-
citly claim that the intervention would be effective in all
populations and settings but did consider the implica-
tions of the trial results for theories of child prosocial
development in a way that implies an assumption that
the results were generalisable [21, 22]. The only refer-
ence to context was in the discussion of one paper [22]
where there was reference to the intervention being ef-
fective despite being delivered in schools in middle/
upper-class neighbourhoods where children may “not
have exceptional problems with peer relations” (p.166).
However, in the case of the more recent and much less
positivistically inclined ASSIST RCT, as we have seen
above, despite estimating the potential population im-
pact of the intervention were it to be scaled up, the au-
thors also reported how intervention effects might have
varied for example with the structure of local communi-
ties, acknowledging that RCT results are not mechanis-
tically generalisable across populations [27].
The way that many systematic reviews are conducted
does suggest that their authors expect interventions to
have broadly similar effects across quite widely differing
populations and settings. Most systematic reviews of so-
cial interventions in the fields of public health and
health services, such as those done within the Cochrane
Collaboration, have as their main focus general ques-
tions such as “do health promoting schools interventions
promote children and young people’s health?” [40]. In
such cases, although the research question defines a spe-
cific population (such as children and young people) and
a specific setting (such as schools), there is often wide
diversity within these populations and settings. Even
when their research questions refer to more specific
populations or settings, these are usually broad in scope,
such as students in schools in low-income countries
[41]. Such questions do not refer to the detail of con-
textual contingencies as realist evaluators would under-
stand them. Systematic reviews often pool effect
estimates from studies conducted across these defined
but diverse populations and settings and use fixed effect
models [42] implying the assumption that the pattern of
cause and effect is the same across studies, with any dif-
ferences in effect sizes being largely the result of chance.
Evidence that this assumption might be unwarranted
comes from recent research that has demonstrated that
systematic reviews of complex interventions rarely pro-
vide a high level of certainty in effect estimates of com-
plex interventions, in large part due to high levels of
heterogeneity in effects [43]. Thus, we acknowledge that
the current picture is mixed, with many systematic re-
views in particular acknowledging that generalisability is
uncertain but proceeding as though it is not.
However, this does not mean that this is the only or
the best use of RCTs. A more productive alternative was
obliquely suggested in the work of Karl Popper, one of
the original key influences on evidence-based policy and
an opponent of positivism, in his critique of “historicist”
social science. By historicism, Popper was referring to
theorists such as Hegel and Marx [44], who aimed to de-
velop general laws explaining the historical evolution of
society and thus to predict future developments. Popper
argued that such theories focus superficially on trends
and mistake these for laws of general determination:
“[historicists] overlook the dependence of trends on
initial conditions. They operate with trends as if they
were unconditional, like laws. Their confusion of laws
with trends makes them believe in trends which are
unconditional (and therefore general)” (p. 118)
Although the subject matter is very different, precisely
the same criticism could be applied to how information
on statistical trends from RCTs is often currently mis-
taken for laws of generalisation. Systematic reviews as
they are generally conducted try to identify overall statis-
tical trends, often failing to do so because findings are
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heterogeneous [13]. But even when they do find consist-
ent evidence of effect sizes [45], this is not an adequate
form of generalisation because, like the historicists cited
by Popper, statistical trends alone say nothing about the
contextual contingencies that are likely to affect whether
similar trends might be expected in other populations,
times and places.
Popper argued instead that social science should aim
to identify general mechanisms of causation but should
theorise and then explore empirically how the conse-
quences of these will be influenced by contextual contin-
gencies. He was also clear that ultimately all such
generalisations will be quite tentative because they are
limited by the potential of humans to make their own
decisions. From a thinker sometimes mistaken for a
positivist [11], this is a remarkably similar approach to
the realist focus on generative mechanisms and context-
mechanism-outcome configurations. As Popper argued,
while generalisations from social science will always be
less definite than those from natural science because of
human agency, the use of theories that include context-
ual contingencies has the potential to enable social sci-
entists to develop more informed and more precisely
worded forms of generalisation.
The INCLUSIVE RCT examined such questions. It fo-
cused on testing various a priori hypotheses about
context-mechanism-outcome configurations informed
by theory, such as whether intervention effects were
greater in schools with more socioeconomically disad-
vantaged students (because the theory of change sug-
gests that boundary erosion will have more impact on
the engagement and hence the health outcomes of such
students). It also drew on qualitative data collected as
part of the process evaluation to develop new configura-
tions, to be tested in post hoc analyses where pertinent
quantitative data allow. Because it was a pragmatic ef-
fectiveness trial of how the intervention worked in a
group of schools under real-world conditions, the IN-
CLUSIVE trial should have included sufficient diversity
in terms of intervention delivery and school settings and
populations to examine a range of context-mechanism-
outcome configurations [46]. Similarly, although not ex-
plicitly realist in its aims, the ASSIST RCT aimed to
identify factors external to the intervention, which might
affect its implementation and effectiveness [47]. Trial pa-
pers hypothesised how outcomes might vary by context
on the basis of its theory and confirmed this to be the
case in statistical analysis:
“Interventions for health promotion based on
diffusing new behavioural norms might work best in
clearly defined, fairly close-knit communities, such as
those assumed to exist in the ex-coalfield communi-
ties of the Welsh valleys, since peer supporters are in
very regular contact with members of a community
whose membership is well defined and stable. Analysis
showed this notion to be true, with a substantially
greater effect in students from valley schools than in
those from other areas” [27]. (pp. 1599-1600)
Any single study will lack the statistical power and het-
erogeneity of context to explore every single context-
mechanism-outcome configuration but there is no rea-
son why this is more the case in experimental than
quasi-experimental or before-and-after research. The ex-
tent to which every individual study should attempt to
investigate all potential mechanisms and contextual con-
tingencies is also highly questionable. Some analyses of
how mechanisms interact with wide variations in con-
text might be best left to evidence synthesis rather than
each individual evaluation study [48, 49].
Do trials embody a unity of methods between the natural
and social sciences?
RCTs may appear vulnerable to this charge because they
are a design also used in natural sciences such as agri-
culture and pharmacology [50]. However, as we saw
from the philosophy of science literature on positivism,
unity of method applies not at the level of a particular
research design but at the level of an overall approach to
science. So the question should be, do RCTs serve a
form of social science that is exclusively focused on stat-
istical associations like agricultural or pharmacological
trials, or can social science RCTs include distinctive
elements?
RCTs, as we have already discussed, clearly do exam-
ine statistical associations between measured phenom-
ena as one way of considering the plausibility of theories
of causation. As mentioned earlier we chose the RCT of
the CDP as an example because of its potential for ad-
hering to some positivist tenets. The CDP trial involved
no qualitative research aiming to understand the per-
spectives, motivations or agency of those involved in de-
livering or receiving the intervention. Although the trial
involved interviews with the children participating in the
programme, these interviews focused solely on struc-
tured assessments of their cognitive social problem solv-
ing and prosocial resolution skills [21].
However, many RCTs of social interventions such as
those of the ASSIST and INCLUSIVE interventions also
collect qualitative data [31, 32]. Qualitative analyses on-
going in the INCLUSIVE trial draw on interviews and
focus groups to explore how those involved with the
intervention described the context of implementation,
the meaning of the intervention for them, their agency
and decisions in delivering or receiving the intervention
and the consequences of these decisions [51]. Like many
contemporary process evaluations, this was guided by a
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sociological framework which sensitised evaluators to
the ways in which local actors make sense of interven-
tions, commit to using them, work collaboratively with
others to draw on intervention resources to act and then
reflect critically on these processes to inform choices
about subsequent actions [52, 53].
Trials like those of ASSIST and INCLUSIVE that in-
clude such components are thus not merely aiming to
generate information about statistical associations but
are also aiming to understand action in terms of mean-
ings and agency, very much in the hermeneutic tradition
of Max Weber. Findings from qualitative research can
be used in different ways within RCTs [54]. They might
be compared with quantitative results to contribute to-
wards assessing the plausibility of causation or, as is the
case in the INCLUSIVE trial, be used to refine theories
delineating context-mechanism-outcome configurations
prior to hypotheses arising from these being tested using
quantitative evidence from RCTs [24, 55]. Or qualitative
research might be analysed separately to develop a dee-
per view of people’s experiences [51]. An example of this
comes from the ASSIST RCT, in which qualitative data
from teachers were used to understand some of the in-
stitutional barriers to implementation [32]. Qualitative
data from students were used to explore how peer edu-
cators actively reinterpreted and reconstructed the inter-
vention from one focused on prevention messages
targeting the overall peer group, encompassing smokers
and non-smokers, to one often restricted to providing
information and targeting friends and predominantly
those who have never smoked [31]. Thus, RCTs of social
interventions can and do employ a multi-faceted ap-
proach that is distinctive from that of field trials of the
biological effects of agricultural or pharmacological
interventions.
While we have drawn on the work of Popper in the
course of this paper to make the general case that an
anti-positivist strand of thought has from the outset
permeated social experimentation, Popper was in fact
himself aligned with positivism on the specific ques-
tion of the unity of method. He dismissed qualitative
research as hopelessly unfocused in comparison to
hypothetico-deductive science [56]. But here we de-
part from Popper in that we believe that qualitative
research, which collects data in the form of partici-
pants’ own accounts of their understandings and
actions, and the consequences of these, can be crucial
in helping social scientists refine their theories of
how social mechanisms operate [57]. Adopting a real-
ist rather than a positivist approach provides an ap-
propriate framework for drawing on both quantitative
and qualitative research because realist social science
aims to explore cause and effect but also meaning
and agency. As Blaikie suggests:
“Social objects cannot be studied in the same way as
natural objects, but they can be studied ‘scientifically’
as social objects… social reality is pre-interpreted, …
society is both produced and reproduced by its mem-
bers and is therefore both a condition, and an out-
come of their activity. The social sciences have a
subject-subject relationship to their subject matter ra-
ther than a subject-object one characteristic of the
natural sciences… [W]hile sharing Positivism’s desire
for producing causal explanations and Interpretivism’s
view on the nature of social reality, Realism argues for
a view of science that is very different from either of
these approaches.” (p. 59)
Discussion
The literature describing or criticizing RCTs of social in-
terventions as being positivist was not comprehensive,
and was in fact frequently inconsistent in defining what
is meant by positivism. The literature on the philosophy
of science provided a more consistent and comprehen-
sive definition of positivism. It depicted this as involving
a number of tenets: the epistemic primacy of direct sen-
sory information as the basis for scientific knowledge;
the requirement that theoretical terms must equate with
empirical terms; the aim of developing universally ap-
plicable laws; and the unity of method between the nat-
ural and social sciences.
Our review of current practice in RCT research fo-
cused on social interventions in public health and health
services suggests a mixed picture. It is very difficult to
see how RCTs embody the epistemic primacy of sensory
information. Instead RCTs appear to embrace Karl Pop-
per’s anti-positivist hypothetico-deductive approach to
enquiry. Many RCTs appear to accept implicitly the re-
quirement that theoretical terms are limited to those
that are empirically measureable, for example by having
logic models that are little more than strings of variables.
However, RCTs are also now being done that employ
more sophisticated theories of change, engaging with the
deeper sociological mechanisms by which social inter-
ventions operate. Even if not all aspects of these mecha-
nisms are directly measured in the realm of the “actual”
they are nonetheless useful in formulating how causality
actually operates in the realm of the real and therefore
in informing more nuanced hypotheses to examine em-
pirically. The picture is mixed as to whether those doing
and synthesizing RCTs see their role as producing
universal or contextually contingent generalisations.
Although there is a tendency among many evidence pro-
ducers and synthesisers to view their role as limited to
the production of statistical trends as a form of general-
isation, this is not an inevitable feature of all RCT-based
research. The work of Karl Popper is again instructive,
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suggesting the need to generalise on the basis not of
trends but of theory that specifies what contextual con-
tingencies will influence the way in which mechanisms
generate outcomes. While RCTs might appear to em-
body a unity of scientific method in that they are also
applied in some natural sciences, there are in fact im-
portant divergences. In many cases, trials of social inter-
ventions use distinctive methods that would never be
used in the natural sciences, such as hermeneutically
inclined qualitative research aiming to understand how
interventions are interpreted and enacted locally.
We have provided suggestions for how RCTs can
move beyond residual features of a positivist paradigm
by focusing on the refinement and testing of theory
concerning intervention mechanisms and the contextual
contingencies affecting how these generate outcomes;
examining not only overall effect sizes but also how
these vary by context in order to test the plausibility of
theory; accepting that generalisations are tentative and
in the form of theories not merely statistical trends; and
taking a distinctly social science approach to trials,
which embraces qualitative data on participants’ mean-
ings and experiences alongside quantitative data on stat-
istical associations.
Our suggestions for the non-positivist conduct of so-
cial experiments draw heavily on the work of Karl
Popper. Popper’s work is useful not only in providing
suggestions for how to do social experimentation better,
but also in illustrating that a non-positivist approach is
not a recent attempt to redeem trials but in fact perme-
ates the intellectual roots of RCTs. However, in our
enthusiasm for using qualitative research within RCTs,
we depart from Popper who dismissed the value of
open-ended research and inductive analysis in building
or refining scientific or social scientific theory. We
believe that the most appropriate paradigm for RCTs of
social interventions is realism. Karl Popper’s brand of
post-positivism and critical realism is united in viewing a
world replete with causal mechanisms independent of
our perceptions. Both also view human knowledge as an
indirect representation of the world, and one that is
infused with theory, fallible and provisional. Both rec-
ognise that positivism is redundant but reject the
relativistic suggestions that no reality exists independ-
ent of our senses or that we cannot rationally judge
between competing truth claims [58]. Although some
realists appear to view realism and “post-positivism”
as rival paradigms [29], like the co-formulator of the
principles of realist evaluation, we regard realism as
the pre-eminent post-positivist paradigm, and one
that rejects both the crude empiricism and determin-
ism of positivism while maintaining a commitment to
developing empirically informed accounts of causal
processes in a real world [59].
Conclusion
We hope we have demonstrated, as requested by our
realist critics, that RCTs are not inherently aligned with
a positivist philosophical position.
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